Wednesday, October 20, 2010

20 October 1973-The Saturday Night Massacre

When Alexander Butterfield, former White House aide, revealed to the Senate committee investigating Watergate that President Nixon had a taping system in the Oval Office, a bombshell detonated in Washington. Since the break-in at the Democratic National Campaign offices in the Watergate complex in June of 72, there had been speculation that the deed was the work of White House staffers, operating with direct or indirect authority from President Nixon. Nixon had been denying this all along, but the revelation of the taping system placed him in a trap. If he were innocent, why not simply release the tapes to those investigating the matter and thus clear his name? Nixon’s adamant refusal to release the tapes to either the Senate committee investigating Watergate, or to Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor investigating the scandal, cast serious doubts on the truth of his statements that no one at the White House had anything to do with the break-in.

Archibald Cox, who had been appointed by Attorney General Eliot Richardson as Watergate special prosecutor, was someone Nixon truly loathed. Prior to his appointment as special prosecutor, Cox had served as dean of the Harvard Law school. Harvard embodied all of Nixon’s resentments from his childhood: growing up poor, never being accepted by those who were in power, especially those with the money to go to Harvard. Harvard was also the alma mater of JFK, the man who had barely beaten Nixon in the 1960 presidential race. Nixon always harbored suspicions that “the Harvards” in CIA and other government agencies had thrown the election to JFK. Cox kept pressing for release of the tapes, using his power of subpoena to get a court order to force Nixon to give up the evidence. Nixon refused the court order, citing executive privilege. Nixon then offered to have Mississippi Senator John Stennis hear part of the tapes and then tell Cox what was on them. This offer was absurd on its face for two reasons. Number one, Nixon would be picking the tapes for Stennis to hear, and given his adamant refusal to part with the tapes, it was quite obvious that Nixon would give Stennis access only to those tapes that would do nothing to implicate the President. Number two, Stennis was notoriously hard of hearing, and since he would be the only one listening to the tapes, there could be no accurate transcript. Cox refused Nixon’s offer of Stennis serving as stenographer, and a show-down was set up between the President and Cox. As the refusal of the court order to hand over the tapes came on Friday, 19 October, Cox figured that he had the weekend to marshal his forces for a court confrontation on Monday. Unfortunately for Cox, he didn’t know how ruthless Nixon could be when cornered.

On the evening of Saturday, 20 October. Nixon summoned Attorney General Eliot Richardson to the White House, and ordered Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson steadfastly refused, stating that he taken the job of Attorney General with the guarantee that even though Cox worked for him, Cox would have absolute freedom to pursue his investigation. Nixon insisted that Richardson fire Cox, prompting Richardson to resign immediately and leave the White House. Nixon next summoned the deputy Attorney General, William Ruckelshaus to the White House, and informed him that as acting head of the Justice Department, he was to fire Cox. Ruckelshaus also refused, stating that both he and Richardson had promised the Senate Watergate committee not to interfere with Cox’s investigation. Nixon pressed more, and Ruckelshaus, like Richardson, promptly resigned and left the White House. The next ranking Justice Department official was Solicitor General Robert Bork (yes, that Bork), who when summoned by Nixon to fire Cox, did so. Bork then moved to have Cox’s offices sealed. In later years Bork defended his actions by saying that had he resigned the Justice Department would have been left without leadership, and that unlike Richardson and Ruckelshaus, he had not made any promises to the Senate Watergate committee.

My family was watching “All in the Family” when CBS news broke into the broadcast with news of the resignations, the firing of Cox, and the sealing of his offices. My dad then said “by Monday there will be troops in the street, and Nixon will claim some kind of emergency empowers him to suspend the Constitution”. To place that remark in context, by 20 October the Arab oil-producing nations had already announced their oil embargo of the Western countries, particularly the United States, for the massive re-arming of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, which was still raging. And, in less than 72 hours, Nixon did place all U.S. forces on DEFCON-3 in response to faulty intelligence that stated the USSR was sending troops to Egypt to help Sadat turn the tide in the Sinai.

While NIxon didn’t declare an emergency and seize power, Congress did begin to act next week. Up to now the Watergate investigation had been a matter for the Senate committee and Cox, but Nixon’s gutting of the Justice Department on a weekend goaded the House into debate on articles of impeachment. The Watergate matter, which Nixon once contemptuously declared a “third rate burglary” had now become a first rate Constitutional crisis. one that would ultimately bring down his presidency.

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